TNAG-2449-FCO40-3565-Legislative-Council-of-Hong-Kong-1992 — Page 124

CODE 18-77

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Mr Ricketts

CONFIDENTIAL

112) Mr. S.

HKB

HONG KONG TELNO 1912:

1.

pan

21/müü

Reference.

HKB 012/1

Thanks Literath cribbed!

POLITICAL AGENDA

217

42

I agree that the Chinese are unlikely to appreciate the Governor's proposed HKG/LegCo "hinge", particularly coupled with his "accountability" initiatives. Their preference would be for the Government to work ever more closely with the CRC,

so long as the CRC continue to defer to Peking on policy, and to concentrate political resources on marginalising the UDHK. (Whether such an approach would actually achieve Chinese objectives is another matter: it might lead to a community back-lash against the CRC.)

2.

However, provided that matters are properly presented, I do not see the Chinese as likely to bring the house down over such initiatives. It is our responsibility to provide effective administration up to 30 June 1997, and we can argue that the status quo is not tenable: things will be different after 1997 when the Chief Executive will have a degree of democratic "legitimacy" in Hong Kong terms (having been nominated after an elective or consultative process). Meanwhile the efficient conduct of Government business through LegCo requires the establishment of a Co-ordinating Committee, or Consultative Committee or Steering Committee.

3.

One can see other difficulties with the Governor's proposals, eg:

(a) The appointment of "non-partisan" non-officials to ExCo. If we are serious abc building up representative government in Hong Kong, we shou.. not seem to discourage the development of party politics. It is one thing perhaps to have people like Professor Wang Gungwu, who would never be expected to enter the political fray. But to send the message that Lydia Dunn can serve on ExCo so long as she declines to stand for election to LegCo and that Allen Lee must quit because of his CRC's political ambitions is surely undesirable.

(b) The HKG/LegCo hinge is bound to try to take on some of ExCo's role, eg in advising on policy towards China, whether on the airport or on constitutional questions. It will be very hard to confine discussion to tight limits.

(c) The Chinese are bound to insist that a precondition of discussing the 1995 LegCo electoral arrangements with us is our recognition that we must operate within the Basic Law: ie they will press for us to concede the directly-elected seats "bargaining card" at the outset.

However I doubt that there is any real need for us to flag

CONFIDENTIAL