CONFIDENTIAL
4.
First, our legal adviser has emphaised that we should not be obscure or misleading in our initial statement. To start at a (bargaining) position which we ourselves felt was untenable could cause us difficulties (in judicial review) later. With this basic advice in mind, we have judged it best to say from the outset that we envisage the maximum amount payable to any officer as being the same as under Hong Kong's limited compensation scheme for superceded officers. As you know this is calculated on actuarial factors at about 50% of the rate of a traditional compensation scheme. We do not believe that our objectives could be achieved, or our obligations discharged, by a lesser payment than this. We reflected on whether it would be better at this opening stage to tell the Hong Kong HMOCS officers that we envisaged that the scheme would be calculated in accordance with traditional actuarial factors, but abated at a proportion to be discussed with them, or even to mention a low figure eg abated by two-thirds, so as to allow scope for negotiation later. We concluded however that this would be counter-productive. present Hong Kong scheme is well known and provides a fair reference point. If we were instead to start talking in terms of percentages, whether of that scheme or of the traditional compensation scheme, we would have no strong defences against upward pressure by the HMOCS lobby. could get sucked into difficult arguments about what value to place on the Secretary of State's protection and, with more political danger, about the extent to which career prospects will in practice be impaired by the transfer of sovereignty. HMOCS officers have will press hard for receiving full traditional compensation: we believe that our best way of resisting this is to refer to the Hong Kong limited scheme from the start as our yardstick, and to stick to it.
We
The
5.
However, you will note that both on the period over which the payments should be phased and the manner of their phasing we have made the statement fairly vague for bargaining reasons. It implies that officers who leave on 30 June 1997, rather than serving for a considerable period with the SAR Government, would receive only a small payment. We had always envisaged that a first payment, around the change of sovereignty, would be necessary to help HMOCS officers to get over the psychological barrier of 1997 and stay on until at least that date. The statement also suggests a possible back-loading of payments, rather than the front-loading which we expect will be necessary to achieve our objectives of ensuring that officers stay up to 1997 and if possible beyond. We can take subsequent decisions in the light of HMOCS reactions to these proposals. Our expectation, of course, is that the reaction will be very negative and that we will be driven back to something like the arrangement we have envisaged ie of a 20% front-loading in June 1997 followed by eight payments of 10% in each successive year.
NC2ACB
CONFIDENTIAL
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.