.M.
Mr. Cof 12 füü
the Bekas
I am concerned Aal
Mr Cox, who mit
Mr Shane has given more
CONFIDENTIAL
Абишла
Discursed with Land
мен тов
91
HKA 233!! then a für 5 cores. Telegram
thought to this issue Han anyone
3
FROM:
NJ Cox
Hong Kong Department
DATE:
11 March 1992
Mr Davies, FED Mr Wye, RAD
here over the last
year,
should te left with these reservations. I certainty Ank it is worth fending tis telegram, bolt because we need ife answer, and because it is an effective way
Mr Ricketts Playging
f
Cc:
Mr Bunten
11/3
our concern about He risks of thing dragged into consultation That said, the only alternative approval is not to fatte to He Chinese
which would to worse. The approad we are HMOCS: BRIEFING THE CHINESE and canimous advice of He how
adopting is on He déar
has Governor, Anbarcoder in
Bekking and Mr Calsworty. I hope they are right.
1.
In the light of Sir R McLaren's abusive comments on our draft speaking note and the negative reactions from the Governor and Mr Galsworthy, our priority is to agree a new form of words on the lines they advise and to try to clear it with the Treasury. However I should like to record my continuing reservations about their approach and my concern about the possible risks.
2.
The original Hong Kong draft made false statements about the nature of HMG's obligations towards HMOCS officers; would have made it very difficult subsequently to seek Chinese acquiescence in any HKG role over sterling safeguards (eg the commercial loan scheme, the feasibility of which the Secretary of State has agreed in correspondence with
Mr Mellor we should continue to explore); and would have been generally unacceptable to the Treasury. However I was even more concerned about the likely Chinese reaction; minor redrafting is somewhat improving the draft on the other points, but the basic approach to the Chinese remains the
same.
3. In brief I think that Sir R McLaren Mr Galsworthy and Lord Wilson are all too optimistic about the prospects of our getting away with merely informing the Chinese of what we have decided and of our avoiding consultation on the subject. Given the other signs of Chinese "struggle" (both on general grounds and perhaps because we are on the eve of a general election and a new Governor's appointment), as well as the likely Chinese suspicions we have already discussed, there must be a non-negligible risk that they will not let this go through on the nod. If they are looking for a row, this is a good pretext. Whatever our motives in introducing the scheme (obligation, incentives to continuity, whim), payment of up to £40 million to Hong Kong public servants over a period of years from 1997 is objectively a major matter straddling 1997. Last year the Secretary of State assured the Chinese in private and confirmed in public that we were very willing to consult the Chinese on major matters
the
"/in
NJCAAW
CONFIDENTIAL
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.