CONFIDENTIAL
Decision not to offer a Scheme
14. This would risk a major exodus of HMOCS from Hong Kong
before 1997, with the consequences noted above for our
ability to administer Hong Kong effectively. HMOCS officers
would no doubt also bring pressure to bear on HMG through
Parliament and the media. Such a campaign would highlight
their lack of confidence in the guarantees contained in the Joint Declaration: this would be damaging in Hong Kong and internationally and would further antagonise Peking. An exodus would face HKG with the decision of what more they
could do to encourage key HMOCS officers, eg in the Police
Force, to stay: for example by raising salaries or improving
other conditions of service. However, HMG could not be
certain of escaping all costs, if they were to adopt this
approach. If the Hong Kong dollar were to collapse, or the
SARG to stop paying pensions, HMG would be obliged to intervene (by the terms of the Carr- Robertson assurance,
see Annex A, that HMG would not stand aside in the case of
default or if a pensioner found himself in financial
difficulties as a result of non-payment of pension).
15. This option would fail to deal with the problem. It
would expose HMG to a political campaign by HMOCS officers
and their supporters for a change of policy, and would risk
a serious deterioration in the quality of administration in
Hong Kong. It would put the onus on HKG to take steps to minimise the damage.
Decision to delay until nearer 1997
16. There are precedents for this in other Dependent
Territories, where safeguard schemes were introduced only just before independence. But the difference in Hong Kong is that we want to persuade HMOCS officers to stay up to and
beyond 1997, and therefore to give them the assurance well
beforehand that their pensions are safe. By delaying a
NFJABA/7
CONFIDENTIAL
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