TNAG-2401-FCO40-3488-Vietnamese-migrants-Orderly-Repatriation-Programme-(ORP)-1992 — Page 210

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MDHI

166747

8684.

4. IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY THE MINISTER BELIEVES WE SHOULD BE READY TO OFFER SOME ADDITIONAL BRITISH ASSISTANCE TO THE REINTEGRATION OF ORP II RETURNS. THE NUMBERS ON EACH FLIGHT WILL NOT BE LARGE AND A PAYMENT - DIRECT TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES - OF USD 300 PER RETURNEE SHOULD NOT INVOLVE US FINDING MORE THAN US 300,000 OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS (MY TELNO 11). HE HOPES THAT SUCH A SMALL SUM COULD BE FOUND WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE ORP AGREEMENT.

5. MEANWHILE WE SHOULD (GROUPS UNDEC TELEGRAM SVCD BY COMMS)

OF IMPROVING THE IMPACT OF THEIR OPERATIONS:

I) WITH UNHCR, WAYS OF INCREASING THE SUMS MADE AVAILABLE FOR REINTEGRATION TO THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES.

II) WITH THE EC, WAYS OF ACCELERATING THROUGH GREATER EMPHASIS ON MICRO-PROJECTS.

6. WE SUSPECT HOWEVER THAT THE VIETNAMESE WILL STAND OUT FOR GUARANTEES OF MORE MONEY TO MATCH THE RATE OF ALL RETURNEES, IE INCLUDING VOLUNTEERS, PARTICULARLY IN EXCESS OF THE 1,000 A MONTH AGREED WITH THE UNHCR. IT IS UNPALATABLE TO GIVE IN TO THIS BLACKMAIL, BUT THE RISK OF LOSING OUR RECENT GAINS IS GREAT. THE MINISTER WOULD THEREFORE FAVOUR

A MORE RADICAL APPROACH.

7. ONE WAY WOULD BE FOR HMG TO TELL THE EC THAT WE ARE WITHHOLDING OUR ADDITIONAL NATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE EC REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME (POUNDS 1.5 MILLION IN NEXT FY)

BECAUSE OUR OFFER HAS NOT HAD THE EFFECT OF YET STIMULATING ANY OTHER NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND WE NEED TO DIRECT THE MONEY URGENTLY TO A MORE POLITICALLY PRESSING PART OF THE REINTEGRATION PROBLEM. HE HOPES THAT THIS MONEY COULD THEN BE GIVEN DIRECTLY TO THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES (IN STEP WITH AN INCREASED FLOW OF RETURNEES) WITH AS LITTLE BUREAUCRATIC INTERVENTION AS POSSIBLE. THE BEST WAY MIGHT BE TO GIVE THE MONEY TO UNHCR (AS THE MOST CREDIBLE AGENCY ON THE GROUND) TO HAND OUT TO THE COMMUNITIES DIRECTLY AFFECTED (SEE ALSO PARA 7 OF MIPT). ALTHOUGH SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT GENERATE FRESH MONEY NOR BE WELL RECEIVED BY THE EC IT DOES SEEM TO OFFER THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF KICK-STARTING THE ORP II PROGRAMME AND SUBJECT TO ODA VIEWS COULD BE COMBINED WITH A (WELL PUBLICISED) INITIATIVE TO GET THE EC TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILTIES OF A FULLY-FLEDGED DEVELOPMENTAL AID PROGRAMME FOR VIETNAM.

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