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[1959] 1 Ch. 368. In the Hastings (No. 3) Harman J.
characteristically summarised the position as he saw it in
succinct terms. He concluded his judgment by saying:
.... this application therefore is precluded, by the absence of the ancient but imaginary right, to go round and round and round from judge to judge when the term is in progress. There was never such a thing; there is not now; and this applicant, having had the judgment of the High Court, cannot have another one".
Because there was still uncertainty as to the position
during the vacation and because the matter required
clarification, the right of an applicant to come before this
court on successive applications was the subject of
legislation.
Section 14 (2) of the Administration of Justice
Act 1960 provided as follows:
"Notwithstanding anything in any enactment or rule of law, where a criminal or civil application for habeas corpus has been made by or in respect of any person, such application shall again be made by or in respect of that person on the same grounds, whether to the same court or judge or to any other court or judge, unless fresh evidence is adduced in support of the application
The question of what would be the "same grounds" and
what would amount to "fresh evidence" was considered in the
case of Ex parte Tarling [1979] 1 WLR 1417. In his judgment
at page 1423 Gibson J. said:
"For the Government of Singapore, Mr. Irvine supported this argument: he submitted that the phrase 'on the same grounds' in section 14 (2) of the Act of 1960 was to be construed as a reference to the 'same complex of facts of the detention' in question. Mr. Nicholls also supported this argument.
We do not accept this submission. The phrase 'on the same grounds' in section 14 (2) of the Act of 1960 cannot have the limited and technical meaning which this
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