He thought
issue of genocide should be recognised in the final agreement through a formula which gave a forward-looking rather than a backward-looking reference to it. Evans was optimistic that the problem was capable of resolution. Dick Solomon et al (including UK officials) were too pessimistic; the situation had changed, the factions were much closer and we should keep encouraging them to treat their concerns at face value. He would like to see the UK being a little less wedded to the Permanent Five approach. In his view, the P5 cannot solve the problem by themselves; there must be some flexibility in the P5 position. One of the problems was that the Soviets could no longer deliver Hanoi and Phnom Penh. He said that the only main controversial issue was the demobilization and disarmament arrangements under the UN peace plan.
In reply to Lord Caithness' question, Evans said that the recent Vietnamese statement did not add anything new for the Australians (who were in close touch), though it might look encouraging to the British and the French. He said that the Vietnamese have got where they are by outlasting the opposition. They must realize that they will not get the trade, bilateral aid, etc until they reach a settlement. Lord Caithness said that if they do not move soon the major players would lose interest, to which Evans replied that he was losing interest fast.
New Zealand
Lord Caithness said that recent messages emanating from New Zealand about UK views on NCND policy were misleading. Evans was unsighted but he did know that Britain was very robust on the issue; he would disregard any such reports.
Evans thought that McKinnon was sound and would go ahead with changes to their present anti-nuclear policy. as soon as he could. Bolger was different: a more cynical character. He only switched policies for patently transparent electoral reasons. He believed that it was up to the New Zealanders to get themselves back into the fold. Their contribution to the Gulf conflict had gone some way towards that, but any moves to bypass the NCND policy would not be looked on kindly by Australia.
Gulf Conflict
Basically a "well done UK" message from Evans (who subsequently at a dinner in Lord Caithness' honour paid a fulsome tribute to Britain's role in leading the inter- national community throughout the crisis. Many, including himself, had believed Germany was on the brink of assuming the leadership role in Europe. That view now had to
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