CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO PRIORITY TOKYO
TELNO 375
OF 05170OZ JUNE 91
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr Man
HKD 026/12
Q DIST?
Cor.
INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, UKREP JLG HONG KONG, PEKING
026/12.
121430
MDLOAN 3598
74
YOUR TELNO 358 AND FCO TELNO 338: JAPAN/HONG KONG: VISIT BY
MIYAMOTO AND ISHII, 3 JUNE
SUMMARY
1
USEFUL TALKS. MIYAMOTO SIGNALS JAPAN'S READINESS TO INTERVENE WITH THE CHINESE IN SUPPORT OF OUR HONG KONG POLICY.
"
DETAIL
2.
MIYAMOTO (HEAD OF THE CHINA DIVISION) ACCOMPANIED BY ISHII (CHINA DIVISION) AND TAKAHASHI (EMBASSY) HAD TWO HOURS OF TALKS ON 3 JUNE WITH PAUL (HEAD/HKD) AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HKD.
3. PAUL GAVE A PRESENTATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA OVER HONG KONG, INCLUDING THE WORK OF THE JLG AND THE AIRPORT TALKS.
4.
MIYAMOTO MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE TAKING A CLOSER INTEREST THAN BEFORE IN HONG KONG AND WERE READY TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE CHINESE TO BEHAVE MORE REASONABLY. THE KEY QUESTION WAS HOW COULD JAPAN HELP MAKE HONG KONG ATTRACTIVE TO CHINA. JAPAN NEEDED TO PROTECT JAPANESE BUSINESS INTERESTS BUT TO PRESENT THIS TO THE CHINESE AS IN CHINA'S BEST INTERESTS. HONG KONG WAS NOT JUST A LOCAL ISSUE. IT HAD STRONG IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WHOLE ASIAN/PACIFIC REGION. HE THOUGHT THAT IF JAPAN, USA, AUSTRALIA AND OTHER LEADING REGIONAL COUNTRIES SPOKE TO CHINA WITH ONE VOICE THIS COULD HAVE SOME EFFECT.
5.
MIYAMOTO SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF HONG KONG'S STABILITY AND PROSPERITY AND THAT CHINA SHOULD BE MORE SENSITIVE TO THIS. HE PROPOSED TO SOUND OUT THE VIEWS OF JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN FROM TRADING COMPANIES, MANUFACTURERS, BANKERS ETC ABOUT WHAT WAS NECESSARY FOR HONG KONG'S ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AFTER 1997. HE WOULD EXCHANGE FURTHER VIEWS WITH US BEFORE MAKING ANY APPROACH TO THE
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