TNAG-2349-FCO40-3418-Political-relations-between-Hong-Kong--China-and-the-Europea-1991 — Page 7

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4. We do of course already make a point of briefing Community partners on our relations with China over Hong

Kong. The Asia Working Group and the Political Committee

occasionally consider these matters. Our Posts brief host

governments after JLG meetings and other major developments eg the understanding on the airport. We also talk to Community diplomats in London. But I think we have tended

(ar as a way of getting right of absod

help eg to look on this more as an information exercise/than an effort to get the Twelve to speak with one voice in dealings Vese

migrants; with China.

5. However in April the Secretary of State did lobby both the French and Italian Foreign Ministers, asking them to

speak out about Hong Kong during their visits to Peking. Both seemed willing to do so, and their representations, together with those of the Japanese, Americans and

Australians, may have helped remind Chinese leaders that showing a "black face", or pursuing a confrontational and intransigent policy, on Hong Kong is not conducive to their

international interests.

6. The EC matters a good deal economically to China, particularly if doubts remain about the durability of China's MFN status. I do not have China trade figures to hand but note that Hong Kong domestic exports to the FRG, UK, Netherlands and France alone amount to some HK $40 billion, as compared to HK $12 billion to Japan for example.

The

7. We shall talk to FED about what more we can do to exploit our partners' potential influence in Peking. Hong Kong problem should mobilise not just partners' sense of solidarity but also their national economic interests. It may sometimes suit us to shelter behind a common position of the Twelve, or to urge other partners to take the lead with the Chinese, on issues such as Tibet or human rights in general. If we pursue these matters on a strictly national

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with

schemes or