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academic/cultural exchanges.
13. Sappro had opened an airlink. He was optimistic.
Korea
There
14. Mr Tanino said that Japan/ROK relations were static. were two problems. The ROK thought that Japan was not addressing the issue of the imbalance in trade/technology transfer. Japan thought this a matter for the private sector. Secondly, the ROK was irritated by the protracted Japan/North Korea talks, which were
getting no where.
The South Koreans were not satisfied inspite of Japanese consultation. Their own dialogue had been suspended for months while the Japanese had been in (admittedly abortive) contact. The South Koreans thought Japan soft towards the North.
15. Mr Tanino said, in confidence, that he was concerned by the new Prime Minister's weak connections with South Korea.
The Koreans were uneasy.
He had not
Mr Miyazawa
visited Seoul since 1975.
should go to Seoul very soon.
16.
Mr Tanino said that Japan had considered recognising North Korea as a state on UN entry. But the South Koreans, on being consulted, were furious at the idea. Japan had therefore postponed its decision until later. Meanwhile, four rounds of talks with North Korea had left the Japanese very little room to concede on key controversial issues. It would take years to make progress.
17. Mr Tanino said that the Japanese had urged North Korea in the
This was a strongest terms to conclude an agreement with the IAEA.
Possible North Korean precondition of normalised relations. acquisition of reprocessing facilities (which the US thought might be soon) was a grave concern to the whole region. Japan had
North Korea claimed neither registered this at the end of August. the intention nor the capability to deploy nuclear weapons, and that verification should also be applied to US nuclear weapons in the South. Japan hoped that the recent US initiative might pave the way to North Korean signature of a full scope safeguards agreement and full implementation.
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