TNAG-2324-FCO40-3368-Hong-Kong-Bill-of-Rights-Vietnamese-boat-people-1991 — Page 25

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) in the absence of mandatory repatriation, the situation would amount to de facto settlement in Hong Kong.

This would arguably breach the Comprehensive Plan of Action

(which says that all non-refugees have to return home);

(c) such a situation would also lead to serious

difficulties with China. The Chinese oppose even the policy of first asylum in Hong Kong. If we were allowing

de facto settlement, they might claim to speak for the people of Hong Kong and accuse us of breaking the Joint Declaration commitment to maintaining and preserving

economic prosperity and social stability;

At

(d) the local reaction in Hong Kong would be severe. the least, Hong Kong would expect the Legislative Council to refuse further funds for dealing with the VBP problem;

(e) the new situation would exert an immense pull factor on potential future Vietnamese migrants.

2..

Bringing the Immigration Ordinance into line with the

ICCPR

5.

In the absence of a ruling that the Immigration Ordinance breaches the ICCPR, it is difficult to know for certain what this would entail. In 1982, on the advice of

FCO Legal Advisers, which was endorsed by the Attorney General, we considered that the Immigration Ordinance would need to list the criteria to be satisfied for prolonged

detention to be justifed. The kinds of criteria which could be specified include that the individual concerned would, if released, be likely to abscond, commit a crime or be a threat to public order or public morals. Each individual would need to be assessed against these criteria. We assume that this would be likely to result in the vast majority of VBP being released. The consequences of Option 2 are thus

RIDAJO/3

CONFIDENTIAL