TNAG-2321-FCO40-3365-Human-rights-in-Hong-Kong-1991 — Page 385

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

CONFIDENTIAL

HKCC 241/2.

pla CD

FROM: P F Ricketts

Hong Kong Department

DATE: 30 September 1991

Mr Davies, FED

cc: Mr Watt, UND

Mr Wye, RAD

CHINA: HUMAN RIGHTS

1.

Many thanks for the chance to comment on your draft submission on this subject.

2. I think that it would be worth considering the implications for Hong Kong of what you propose in a single consolidated paragraph. I set out below a suggested form of words. This would mean deleting the reference to Hong Kong in para 11c (3) and para 14.

3. I suggest something on the following lines (perhaps to be inserted as a new paragraph 13):

"There is a Hong Kong dimension that needs to be kept in mind. The Chinese are perfectly capable of keeping their bilateral relations with us distinct from their dealings with us over Hong Kong when it suits them to do so. Maintaining pressure on them over human rights in the way set out here need not therefore complicate our efforts to promote more cooperative relations in the JLG. But if the Chinese concluded that our campaign on human rights had reached the point where we were promoting far reaching institutional change in China, they would be all the more suspicious of our wish to promote a faster pace of democracy in Hong Kong. is also likely that, by keeping up the pressure on the Chinese on human rights, we would also embolden human rights activists in Hong Kong to step up their campaign of demonstrations (there was a fairly large demonstration in Hong Kong on 29 September to mark Chinese National Day). This too will fuel Chinese anxieties about democracy in Hong Kong, and may lead them to resurrect allegations of "subversive activity" in Hong Kong".

4.

It

There is no easy way of avoiding these side-effects of our human rights policy in China. But they reinforce the case for pursuing our dialogue with the Chinese in a constructive rather than a confrontational framework and for managing any contacts with prominent Chinese dissidents so as to minimise the risk that these will encourage activists in Hong Kong to stir up protest action there.

BUGACG

PF Ricketts

R. Schett

CONFIDENTIAL

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