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should become public. My recommendation that we should avoid early confirmation of the call in order to minimise Chinese scope for complaints was not accepted. (I had suggested a conditional interim
reply to Lord Ennals now, followed by firm confirmation much nearer the time).
4.
Sir R McLaren has now expressed doubts about the wisdom of
letting the cat out of the bag too soon. He points out the
potentially harmful effects on Lord Caithness' visit (26 November
4 December). I very much agree with him as my earlier
recommendation made clear that we should try to play this long to
avoid exciting the Chinese too soon. An additional factor is that
we have just spent considerable time, effort and money entertaining Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua, with the probable end-result of good orders for inter alia BAe and Rolls-Royce. A decent interval should elapse
before the Chinese learn that the Dalai Lama is to meet the Prime
Minister, or much of the good-will generated may be jeopardised.
5.
There is no inherent contradiction between drawing back slightly from the advice on timing contained in the PS letter of 20 October and what No 10 now propose. They ask that the substantive reply about the Prime Minister's decision to meet the Dalai Lama should go to Sir R Luce rather than Lord Ennals. The draft replies reflect
that request, while enjoining Lord Ennals to discretion over the Prime Minister's plans.
6. No 10 have pencilled in a call at 9.00 am on Monday 2 December. They are still trying to contact the Archbishop of Canterbury. I suggest that FED should inform the Office of Tibet about the call and its timing at a time to be determined somewhat nearer the date.
The Office of Tibet is much more discreet than Lord Ennals.
F
7. Lord Ennals has meanwhile sent me a video of the Dalai Lama's visit to Washington (his letter of 28 October).
H L1 Davies
CONE IDENTIAL
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