TNAG-2292-FCO40-3304-Official-visits-from-Hong-Kong-to-China-1991 — Page 118

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caused a lot of concern in HK. We were looking at ways to improve our publicity efforts, for example we gave each II we repatriated a warning notice about HKG's policy. We had also offered via NCNA to provide publicity materials for use on the mainland. One blackspot for the trade in IIs was Shekou. I expressed gratitude for what the Chinese Authorities had done

and hoped these efforts could be stepped up.

11.

We covered much the same ground on smuggling as with

the HKMAO, but in more detail. Wang was keen to blame syndicates in Hong Kong, Taiwan, even Indonesia and the Philippines (anywhere but the PRC!). Smugglers were increasingly sophisticated and difficult to locate. He floated the idea of improved interception of smugglers communications (in HK) and exchange of intelligence. I again went through in

detail the measures we had taken. This message had obviously not got through to Peking properly, and Mr. Yu asked if we could send details of what had actually been done (by copy of

this minute, grateful if S for S could provide copies of all relevant ordinances/orders, and anything else that we can hand

over).

12.

I again asked for the return of stolen cars to be

speeded up. Wang was positive about the generalities, but said that the specific details of returning stolen cars were being left to individual units. This sounds like a recipe for slow

progress.

13.

Wang said that the MPS were very concerned about the illegal use of firearms. The problem was worse on the mainland than in Hong Kong, with in 1990 over 50 firearms related murders in Guangxi alone, and 7 policemen shot in Guangdong. Prices outside China were much higher than inside, the

incentive to smuggle was therefore great. I went over the anxieties this caused in Hong Kong and our hope that through cooperation we could bring the illegal trade under control.

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