or to deal with "turmoil" which endangers national security. The prospect that the Chinese will intervene in Hong Kong if matters get beyond the capacity of the SAR Government to discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of public order is inherent in the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, and the events in Tianamen Square do no more than bring home the reality of how Chinese sovereign power could be exercised. No change was made in the provision relating to the stationing of military forces in the SAR [21], the emergency laws article was modified to emphasize that the declaration of an emergency relates to turmoil which endangers national unity or security, but the power to extend "the relevant laws" remains essentially unchanged in
[22] the text finally adopted:
Deng Xiaoping's unqualified statement reported in January 1991 that the People's Liberation Army in Hong Kong could be "mobilised
[23] when there is turmoil or rioting' in Hong Kong! leaves no room for doubt that these provisions are intended to have a practical meaning.
14.
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The drafting of provisions to make clear various powers of the Central Authorities to make explicit what for the PRC is implicit in China's assumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong - was also a matter of concern in Hong Kong. The matters at issue centred on how the power to amend the Basic Law was to be exercised, which authority had power to interpret the Basic Law (including the power to determine whether the legislature of the SAR had exceeded its powers), and the extent to which the laws of the PRC would apply in
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