TNAG-2277-FCO40-3276-Hong-Kong-and-the-media-1991 — Page 8

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DISTRIBUTION

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MS BARRETT LEGAL ADVISERS

MISS BROOKS LEGAL ADVISERS

MISS NEVILLE-JONES CAB OFFICE

SIR P CRADOCK NO.10

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A D Harris Esq

Information Department

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BBC WORLD SERVICE: FUTURE OF THE EAST ASIA RELAY STATION HONG KONG

1. Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 1 November to Sir David Wilson. I agree with the analysis in your paragraphs 2 - 5. Having been involved in the early discussions about the Hong Kong relay station in the early 1980s I would add that it was made clear to the BBC from the outset that the chances of their being able to carry on broadcasting from Hong Kong after 1997 were slim: they went into the project with their eyes open.

2.

My answers to the specific questions posed in your paragraph 6 are as follows:

(i) Almost none, unless there is a radical change in the poltiical climate here. That could happen but I would not want to hazard

guess a s to the timing. And even

if the communist system does collapse here before 1997 there can be no guarantee that a new government would be favourably disposed to the idea of a foreign station broad- casting to China from Chinese territory.

(ii) If there is a break in the clouds we should seize the opportunity to broach the subject with the Chinese.

I think we would have nothing to lose from consulting them after a decision in principle had been taken to move station elsewhere but before the die had been cast.

the

(iii) For Hong Kong to say, but:

(iv) A unilateral decision to extend the present lease and licence beyond 1997 would be treated by the Chinese as a clear violation of our understanding that major matters extending across the 1997 barrier should be decided after consultation and agreement. The Chinese would regard the use of Hong Kong for the rebroadcasting of BBC programmes without their permission after 1997 as a a serious violation of their sovereignty.

.../ (v)

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