TNAG-2269-FCO40-3268-Hong-Kong-Her-Majesty-s-Overseas-Civil-Service-(HMOCS)-poli-1991 — Page 81

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B: THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN HONG KONG

11. Mr Paul said that Hong Kong needed to retain the loyalty and motivation of its civil service up to 1997. This was a precondition for a successful administration and a smooth transition. This would not be possible without the services of HMOCS members. The Police Force were assuming

increasing responsibilities in the run-up to 1997 and were heavily dependent on their large expatriate contingent. Mr Shipley added that members of HMOCS were becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of a decision on an issue to which HMG should be firmly committed. This had

caused much discontent amongst the police in recent months. There was also a very serious morale problem throughout the civil service. Because HKG was losing a large number of local officers at present it was vital to keep HMOCS members in the police and administration. Mr Paul said that if

there was an exodus of expatriate police officers, the cohesion of the police force would suffer and the

maintenance of law and order would be threatened.

Chinese would not tolerate a breakdown of law and order: it

could make them intervene directly to restore it. As a result, Hong Kong would lose the autonomy we had negotiated

for it in the Joint Declaration. Another scenario would be

that HMG would have to fill the gap with the British

Garrison at a substantial cost and at a time when HMG was

trying to run down the garrison.

The

12. Mr Rayson asked for clarification about the distinction

between HMOCS officers and other HKG civil servants.

Mr Shipley said that HKG made no distinction between HMOCS

officers and its other civil servants. The distinction was

made by HMG. Members of HMOCS were appointed by the Secretary of State, and HMG recognised its special obligations to them. Mr Rayson said that conditions of service and pay, rather than pension protection, were the

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CONFIDENTIAL