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commercial reasons why they were investing in this way to try and counter what was obviously a deeply engrained belief
about trying to filter off Hong Kong assets into Britain.
(c) Sir Adrian said he thought it worth giving one more push on the airport. If agreement was not possible, it was important that that there should be soft landing. He said that he did not think the moth-balling of the airport would cause real problems in Hong Kong: the focus would switch to
the practical matter of getting on with other ways of increasing airport capacity. However he thought a decision to moth-ball could do a lot of damage outside Hong Kong and
huge damage if it was seen as being the end of infrastructure development in Hong Kong.
(d) Sir Adrian did not think that turning to the new
airports in Shen Zhen or in Macao was practicable. He
acknowledged that there would obviously be an element of
special pleading in this, because of Cathay Pacific's air
services rights. But he insisted that neither of these two
airports could provide a realistic alternative.
2. The Secretary of State said that we were now in the
process of having one last push to get an agreement over the
airport. But the real problem was the Chinese insistance on
solutions through consultations for all major matters
straddling 1997. The Chinese clearly viewed this as
requiring agreement before the Hong Kong Government proceeded. This had serious implications for many areas,
not just the airport. The Executive Council was worried.
The new Ambassador, Robin MacLaren, had gone with a very
high level message, in an effort to try and break the impasse. If we could not, our aim was to engineer as soft a
landing as possible: although the Secretary of State
cautioned that the Hong Kong press might not allow us to
achieve this.
3. The Secretary of State said that these issues would be
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