THE NEXT SIX YEARS
CONFIDENTIAL
9.
Against this background, it will become increasingly difficult to run Hong Kong as 1997 approaches.
We have an
important responsibility towards the people of Hong Kong to make a success of this endeavour; and it is also very much in Britain's interest that we should do so. A collapse in confidence in Hong Kong in or before 1997 would have very serious consequences for us. Apart from the political downside, we could face massive new immigration pressures and British commercial interests in the territory could incur huge losses.
10.
Chinese domestic politics are in a transitional phase. New leaders will emerge once the present generation of veterans pass from the scene. But there is no certainty that a successor government will embrace political reform or have attitudes towards Hong Kong markedly different from those which now prevail. It would be prudent to assume that there will be no fundamental change in the run up to 1997.
11. The handling of our relationship with China will be crucial. We will not have discharged our responsibilities towards the people of Hong Kong if the transfer of sovereignty takes place in an atmosphere of mistrust and recrimination. That would get the Special Administrative Region off to a bad start and greatly reduce the chances of its enjoying the high degree of autonomy provided for in the Joint Declaration. We need instead to promote as much continuity as possible between systems and people over the 1997 barrier, particularly in the Civil Service and the legislature, and a good working relationship between the people who will run Hong Kong after 1997 and the Chinese authorities. That will require greater consultation with the Chinese over major decisions in Hong Kong: they cannot be expected to take everything we or the Hong Kong
LEGAER/5
CONFIDENTIAL
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