CONFIDENTIAL
From:
Date:
cc:
Minister
30 October, 1991
PS/PUS
Minister (C)
Head of Chancery
Mr Tebbit
Mr Torry
MI BLUWile
Private Secretary
PUS's LUNCH WITH BARTHOLOMEW, NILES AND GOMPERT:
28 October
1. Most of the discussion over the lunch the Ambassador gave on 28
As October was about the European security and defence identity. such it followed very similar lines to those of Sir D Gillmore's more formal meetings. It was generally agreed that it would be
That would right for the Americans to set down some markers. probably have to be done at Rome rather than before it. perhaps too late for fresh language to be put into the Communique. In the circumstances, the most appropriate vehicle would be a positively worded Presidential statement, followed by a public presentation of the essential principles at a press conference. Those present doubted whether even the French would contradict what President Bush would have to say.
2. Both the Ambassador and the PUS left the lunch guests in no doubt of the importance to us of getting Rome right in the run up
Mr Bartholomew to the crucial watershed represented by Maastricht. spoke warmly, as he has before, against the way the terms of the debate were now becoming distorted. The Americans were being presented as both demandeurs and as the main defenders of NATO, with the EC lining up in the name of progress on the other side. He also spoke forcefully of the inadmissability of the relationship with the United States being included in a list for EC joint action, as it was under the Franco-German proposals.
3.
Sir David Gillmore also spoke about the need for CFE ratification and whether enough was being done to get it home to the Soviet Union and its constituent republics that early progress was desirable. Mr Niles and Mr Gompert reported that the Americans had made strong representations on this issue and on the unacceptability of nuclear weapons being used as bargaining chips in the intra-Republican jockeying for position as the Soviet Union disintegrated. The Americans had spoken to the Byelorussians, to Zlenko for the Ukrainians and Kozyrev for the Russian Republic. Concern was expressed at the pace of the Soviet descent into incoherence. The Americans were relieved that Yeltsin did not on 28 October make a public claim to be the protector of Russians living outside the Russian Republics, but felt that unless we were lucky, this would happen in due course. The implications of any such move would clearly be dangerous, as the Yugoslav case
illustrated.
CONFIDENTIAL
/4. The PUS
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