TNAG-2244-FCO40-3225-Most-favoured-nation-status-for-China-impact-on-Hong-Kong-1991 — Page 35

CONFIDENTIAL

From:

Date:

Minister

28 October, 1991

1. 18 ↑ Ma Barona marip

cc:

Sir David Gillmore

A

2.

تاشو

Plus's visió

M

Minister (C)

Head of Chancery

Mr Tebbit

Mr Torry

Mr Browne

Private secretary

PUS's CALL ON THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS: 28 October, 1991

Mr Niles began by

The

1. The PUS called on Mr Niles on 28 October. saying that the Administration were fully conscious of how important it was to get both the words and the thoughts behind them right before Rome, as a pre-cursor also to Maastricht. Bush/Gorbachev meeting on 29 October would not be a decision-making occasion but would provide an opportunity for a review of the current position. President Havel of Czechoslovakia had been eloquent in his recent meeting with the President in setting out the continuing importance of NATO. The last piece of the

There was a reasonable background for Rome was the Uruguay Round. hope that agreement would have been reached on the essential points by the end of the year.

2. Sir D Gillmore said that the role of the Germans in all of the areas mentioned by Mr Niles would be crucial. The Prime Minister's meeting with Chancellor Kohl on 1 November would be a seminal event. We were at a watershed which would determine the future

In that shape of Europe and the position of the UK in particular. sense Rome would represent an important way station on the journey towards Maastricht. If the Rome message were fudged or what was off limits were left unclear it would be much harder for the British Government to ensure the right outcome at Maastricht. understood the American readiness to say that the Europeans must

On the other hand there sort out their own internal arrangements. were some bottom lines for the British and, he thought, as for the Americans. The US Administration ought to be in no doubt that the British Government would not sign up to an IGC text which breached those bottom lines. Making the WEU subordinate to the EC, for example, would be the effective end of NATO.

3. Mr Niles said that he thought the American position had been made clear in the talks he and colleagues had had with the British,

He did not Germans and French in the week beginning 7 October. think that there could be any doubt as to the importance of preserving the central position of NATO for the development of foreign policies. He took the point that Rome had to reaffirm what had been agreed at Copenhagen, and to build on it, as a lead up to Maastricht. The US approach was informed by the confusion, some of which he thought had been deliberate, which had followed on their demarches of February this year. Their present approach was therefore to point to what they liked about the various ideas that had been put on the table and to pose questions on those aspects

/where

CONFIDENTIAL