JUL 19 '91 14:27 R. DUFFY WALL & ASSOCIATES
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PART II:
ADMINISTRATION'S ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
PROLIFERATION CONCERNS
The United States is engaged in a high-level dialogue with the Chinese that began early in our relationship. Looking at the broad trends in China's nonproliferation policy since normalization in 1979, it is clear that our dialogue has paid off in important areas, demonstrated by China's evolution toward international consensus on nonproliferation in areas of great importance to us. For example, China, which once held an antagonistic view of multilateral controls on nuclear exports, joined the IAEA in 1984 and sent observers to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1990.
Middle East/South Asia
China's support for the Middle East arms control initiative is another case in point. China's participation in the initiative is a positive step that will strengthen international nonproliferation efforts and indicates China's resolve to contribute to efforts to attain stability in the Middle East. addition, China's willingness to participate in multilateral efforts to reduce tension in South Asia will be crucial to establishing stability in that volatile region.
In
Moreover, we have seen Chinese arms sales restraint in some areas where we have vital interests. For example, to the best of our knowledge, apart from the 1987/88 sale of missiles to Saudi Arabia, China has not delivered medium-range missiles to the Middle East. It is clear that in other specific cases China has taken international concerns into account and declined proposed missilė exports to prospective buyers.
Underscoring Our Concerns
It is because serious concerns remain that we want to maintain a constructive nonproliferation dialogue with Beijing. We do not intend to ignore current problems, but isolating China by dismantling the framework for our relations is not the way to advance our nonproliferation objectives.
For
We have the means available to underscore our concerns where there are differences in our approaches to nonproliferation and we have used these legislative and executive branch tools. example, we have imposed trade sanctions mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act on Chinese entities involved in missile-related activities. We have also announced the Administration's decision that, pending progress toward our nonproliferation objectives, we will not license high speed computers and will not issue further waivers of legislative restrictions on satellite exports. These new sanctions have been imposed in addition to the existing sanctions announced immediately following the June 1989 assault on Tiananmen and amplified by Congress in the Department of State Authorization
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