TNAG-2243-FCO40-3224-Most-favoured-nation-status-for-China-impact-on-Hong-Kong-1991 — Page 84

From the Private Secretary

this

CONFIDENTIAL

His 09048

Dear Lima.

ET MON

Mr. Bone, ERD. I have telegraphed the tex to the Secretary of State in Delhi, copied to Wto

p5/Mr. Hogy

Ps/Mr. Gwel-Jones PS/ Lord Duithneas PS/POS

Mr Westo Mr Bayne Si Holes

10 DOWNING STREET

Pa

LONDON SWIA 2AA

MEN ale. MrStone

√28/5

23 May 1991

Mr. Faurieather M- Tait W. Buns

Mr. Gore Booth

Heads: NENAD Sor] NAD

TELEPHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

FED

HKD

SEAD

President Bush telephoned the Prime Minister this afternoon. The call lasted fifteen minutes. The following were the main points.

Gorbachev's attendance at the Economic Summit

Neño

Sondr

President Bush said he wanted to stay close to our thinking on President Gorbachev's possible attendance at the Economic Summit. Primakov and Yavlinsky would be visiting Washington next week and he would have a better feel by then of Soviet thinking. He would continue to take the line that no decision had yet been taken on Gorbachev's attendance, and that it was anyway a matter for the whole of the G7. He wanted to indicate that the United States would continue to help the Soviet Union, but he did not want to get into a situation where Gorbachev came to the Summit with his hat in his hand and with a demand for $100 billion on the table. The discussions with the Russians on arms control had gone well and the gap on CFE was now very narrow indeed. The Russians thought that the gap on START had narrowed considerably. He himself might go to Moscow before the Economic Summit.

The Prime Minister said that the possibility of a bilateral Summit was good news, as was the fact that progress had been made on CFE. He himself remained cool on the possibility of Gorbachev coming to the Summit because it would cost a lot of money. Equally, if we decided now, we could be faced with an embarrassingly bad situation in the Soviet Union by July. However, without knowing Chancellor Kohl's view, he suspected that the Chancellor would want Gorbachev to come. The Russians would almost certainly raise the issue with Mrs Thatcher during her visit next week. President Bush said that he agreed that Chancellor Kohl probably would in the last analysis want Gorbachev to come to the Summit. His position was that he did not mind Gorbachev coming to London, and he was prepared to work something out so that the Soviet Union did not go away empty handed, but he was not prepared to have Gorbachev come asking for $100 billion. That would have to be rejected and it would then look as if Gorbachev had suffered a rebuff.

23

CONFIDENTIAL