TNAG-2243-FCO40-3224-Most-favoured-nation-status-for-China-impact-on-Hong-Kong-1991 — Page 61

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MDHIAN 9673

PATTERN OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED HUMAN RIGHTS, ENDING RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS FREEDOMS AND THE VOA, TERMINATING INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT OF CHINESE CITIZENS, ENSURING ACCESS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS TO PRISONERS, TRIALS, AND PLACES OF DETENTION, ENSURING FREEDOM FROM TORTURE AND FROM INHUMANE PRISON CONDITIONS, TERMINATING THE PROHIBITIONS ON PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND DEMONSTRATION, AND PROHIBITED THE USE OF FORCED LABOUR, ESPECIALLY IN THE PRODUCTION OF EXPORTS, AND WAS TAKING OTHER APPROPRIATE ACTION TO PROMOTE IMPROVEMENT IN THE RECOGNITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY. THE PEASE BILL ADDS THAT THE PRESIDENT, IN DECIDING WHETHER TO RECOMMEND AN EXTENSION IN 1992, SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFECTS THAT SUCH AN EXTENSION, OR ABSENCE OF IT, MIGHT HAVE ON HONG KONG AND WHETHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS ADHERING TO THE JOINT DECLARATION, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH CHINA HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION ON GATT ACCESSION FOR TAIWAN. PELOSI'S CONDITIONS WERE THOSE LISTED IN PARA 4 OF OUR TELNO 1474.) 4. AS WE HAVE REPORTED THERE IS NO SIGN, YET, OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ANY CONDITIONS. THEIR

PRESENT STRATEGY IS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO USE THE TOOLS ALREADY AT THEIR DISPOSAL (EG SATELLITE LICENCES) TO PUT PRESSURE ON CHINA, AND THAT IT IS NOT THEREFORE NECESSARY TO ATTACH CONDITIONS TO MFN. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO SAY HOW FAR THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE FORCED TO CONSIDER CONDITIONALITY, ALTHOUGH, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, THE EXPECTATION IS THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO CONTEMPLATE LOOSE CONDITIONALITY.

5.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD PROBABLY

APPRECIATE OUR DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE DAMAGE THAT CONDITIONALITY

WOULD DO TO HONG KONG. RATHER THAN TRY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DIFFERENT

TYPES OF CONDITIONALITY, THE BEST APPROACH MIGHT BE TO ARGUE THAT WE WOULD NOT WELCOME ANY CONDITIONS WHICH MIGHT CREATE A CLIMATE OF UNCERTAINTY

IN HONG KONG AND EXACERBATE THE PROBLEMS IN HONG KONG IN THE DIFFICULT

YEARS BETWEEN NOW AND 1997. WE SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT ANY CONDITIONS

WHICH SEEK TO LINK MFN TO CHINA'S RESPECT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION ARE UNLIKELY TO PROVE EFFECTIVE AND, INDEED, MAY EVEN BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE

ACLAND

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