TNAG-2240-FCO40-3219-Future-of-Hong-Kong-Royal-Navy-presence-1991 — Page 102

M

•

F. Ranken.

17th June 1991.

THREATENED WITHDRAWAL IN MARCH 1992 OF THE ROYAL NAVY'S HONG KONG SQUADRON

Following protracted inter-departmental discussions, the Defence Secretary has just written to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stating his intention to withdraw the Hong Kong patrol vessel squadron and close down HM Naval Base by March 1992 unless the Hong Kong Government (HKG) is prepared to take over all or most of the 35% of the cost of running the Hong Kong Squadron presently paid by the UK Government (HMG); this is estimated to amount to £15 million over the period from April 1992 to hand-over to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in June 1997, on expiry of the 99-year lease of the New Territories signed on 9 June 1898. This is now just another small item to be added to the Secretary's "Options for Change, outlined in parliament in July 1990, aimed at producing drastic

11

reductions in the UK defence budget

A

part of the so-called peace dividend.

2. This intended early withdrawal and closure had been agree in 1988 prior to the Tianenmen Square massacre, and in consequence no provision for the UK costs of the Squadron had been included in the Long Term Costings beyond March 1992 (except for some UK manning). The Defence Secretary's letter in effect states that, while he accepts that circumstances have greatly changed, he is not prepared to amend his long-term costings to cover these costs for an extra five years, without substantial savings; reducing to two ships would only cut UK costs by some £2 million, not sufficient to satisfy HMG. He suggests the HKG might buy the ships, in which case some RN officers and crews could still be made available as loan service personnel, paid for by the HKG. (However, unless the ships remained under HMG control, it would be impossible, indeed illegal, for them to fly the White Ensign, and the Hong Kong flag would not be an acceptable alternative to represent HMG's continuing commitment to the Colony, as was demonstrated only too clearly by events leading to the Falkland Islands war in 1982.)

3.

4.

"

The Hong Kong Squadron presently comprises the three patrol vessels "Peacock, "Plover" and "Starling;" these (and two other vessels, the "Swallow" and "Swift," sold to the Irish Government in 1988), were built by Hall Russell Shipbuilders in Aberdeen, two-thirds of the cost having been paid by the Hong Kong Government. They are fast, ocean-going, excellent seaboats and quite capable warships; the present reduced Squadron took part with other RN Units in Far East/Pacific exercises during 1989 in the South China Sea. "The Government fully recognises its responsibility for the security of Hong Kong until

until 1997 and will proceed with the phased withdrawal of the garrison with that in mind, and in full consultation with the Hong Hong Government" (SDE90, Vol. 1, para. 208 - published in April 1990 before

before the Tiananmen Square massacre). The HK Garrison consists of four infantry battalions, three of them Gurkhas,

them Gurkhas, Gurkha signals, and engineer and

and transport regiments, supported by a squadron of the Army Air Corps, an RAF Wessex squadron and the RN Patrol Vessels; it is commanded by a Major General.

The

that

Defence Secretary claims that these ships have no military role, but is not so; there certainly are military roles, not least in countering incursions by PRC Naval units. Their offshore capability in bad weather these ships well-suited to deal with smugglers, drug-runners, pirates and illegal immigrants

Nam boat-people and others from mainland PRC, including in local boats. These are often encountered well beyond the range of

the HK Police boats, which are unsafe more than a mile or two offshore, much less in bad weather. Boat people continue to arrive from Viet Nam,

an open sea voyage of 500-700 n.miles, at a rate of at least 100 a day; on this basis the new camp for 2,000 opening on one of the outer islands will

will be full in under three weeks, and efforts to repatriate these people have not been successful, in face of opposition from the United States, and resulting refusal by the Viet Nam Government to accept them.