TNAG-2239-FCO40-3218-Future-of-Hong-Kong-Royal-Navy-presence-1991 — Page 98

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Meanwhile the Hong Kong police force and its maritime units are grossly over-stretched; they badly need the extra assistance provided by the RN and other Service units and personnel. There is the makings of great unrest in the camps and numerous other difficulties and lawlessness throughout the Colony unless this range of external pressures can be countered and contained. There is no possibility of them taking over full responsibility with their present marine resources, nor for manning and operating the Patrol Vessels; any handover in March 1992 is wholly unrealistic. If the Hong Kong Squadron is withdrawn, it is highly probable that a crisis will arise later which necessitates the rapid despatch from the UK of a frigate or

or destroyer at far greater cost than the present £15 million contribution the Defence Secretary wants to stop paying after financial year.

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The Hong Kong Government considers the presence of the RN Vessels essential, not least because they fly the White Ensign and represent HM Government, which continues to be the sovereign power until 1997, and must be seen to remain so, as one vital element in sustaining the confidence of this very crowded maritime community to remain in Hong Kong, especially in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square. The present population already exceeds six million crowded into an area of only 404 sq.s.miles of land (including many islands) and its harbour covering 23 sq.s.miles of water. This is despite an exodus of at least 60,000 people a year to North America, Europe and elsewhere (but now restricted to 50,000 families to the UK), and the fact that a high proportion of companies have established new or alternative headquarters overseas, just in case things go too far wrong during or following the take-over by the PRC.

The PRC government is very concerned that law and order is preserved within Hong Kong and unrest is prevented, since they recognise the danger of this deteriorating into political extremism that could become difficult to contain.

Following Tainanmen Square, the Governor of Hong Kong has lost a lot of credibility and is under enormous pressure at present because of his inability to secure agreement on numerous important matters with the Beijing government, which is exerting increasing influence over every major development in

in Hong Kong. The present major issue is a decision on the financing and construction of a new international airport, which is urgently needed, and should already have been started.

With the continuing impasse over the airport, it is considered to be quite out of the question for the Governor to seek the approval of his Council to take over the rest of the costs of the Hong Kong Patrol Vessel Squadron. Nevertheless he and the

the HKG are very keen indeed that these vessels, and particularly the White Ensign now remain in Hong Kong until 1997, most particularly to bolster confidence in HMG's continuing commitment to the Colony, which is greatly doubted by increasing numbers of HK citizens. Removing these RN ships is considered extremely destabilising in HK, and the impact on the PRC Government's perceptions will certainly be damaging, since it indicates the precipitate (early) withdrawal of HMG's commitment the Colony; will it not also lead to greater interference in HK affairs, adding to the risk of unrest - and to the flight of more talented people?

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