TNAG-2239-FCO40-3218-Future-of-Hong-Kong-Royal-Navy-presence-1991 — Page 228

SECRET UK EYES A LOCSEN

little reduction in the number of support troops.

83. The withdrawal of the second battalion, accompanied by a comensurate withdrawal of elements of the combat support and combat service support units, will allow C2 of the

of the land forces to be

rationalised. At this point, command of all units should be vested in a one * HQ as the span of command will be too large for anything else. Additionally, the retention of a brigade HQ will provide the appropriate level of C2 to manage the in-theatre manoeuvre units and to assimilate reinforcements before the arrival of a reinforcing

brigade, should JTP 30 have to be activated.

Further

84. It is envisaged that it should be possible to disband HQ Support Troops by grouping some of the units currently under its command with HQ 48 Brigade, and for ease of administration placing the remaining

units directly under command HQ British Forces. rationalisation should be possible if and when the Garrison is reduced

to a single battalion group. In this scenario it is likely that the brigade HQ could be removed.

be removed and replaced with a small tactical

headquarters from HQ British Forces. This must be considered in

detail in the run-up to the 1993 Review.

Summary.

85. HQ BFHK remains confident that the first infantry battalion will

be able to withdraw in the Autumn of 1992. The third cannot, in the

light of all the concerns voiced throughout this paper, depart before

late 1996/early 1997. It only remains therefore, to decide on the timing of the withdrawal of the second infantry battalion. In this context, consideration must take due account of the Threat Assessment,

the progress of the Police Force expansion plans together with an assessment of their ability to cope with their expanded role, and

wider political factors.

Page 32of 47 pages

LOCSEN

UK EYES A

SECRET