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would, in any event, be struck a severe blow if the Garrison had to be deployed in full over an extended period to support the Police, the presence of an obviously robust and capable British Garrison would in demonstrating the extent of the British Government's commitment - thereby have a deterrent effect for those tempted to capitalise on internal instability. There are also many ways in which the Garrison could assist the civil authorities without undermining the primacy of
the Police in internal security.
The Requirement and Intentions of HMG.
25. In So far as HMG has always been determined to accept its responsibilities for Hong Kong until June 1997, and therefore to maintain a Garrison of appropriate strength
strength and composition to
demonstrate both sovereignty and its commitment to act in support of
the HKG, the events of 1989 have not affected HMG's intentions.
Given, however, the blows struck to confidence in Hong Kong in June
1989 and by subsequent actions and pronouncements by the PRC, the shape and size of the force required to fulfill those intentions at
various stages of the run-down could be different from those envisaged in the 1987 plan.
Summary.
26. For all the reasons detailed above, the logic of the events in
1989 is likely to push all three Governments more towards a "stronger for longer" approach to the withdrawal of the British Garrison from Hong Kong than was the case in 1987.
PART TWO
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THE THREAT AND PLANNING FACTORS
THE THREAT
Page 1 of 47 pages
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