SECRET UK EYES A LOCSEN
106)
19.
The events in mid-1989, and their aftermath, have heightened the PRC's concern about instability in Hong Kong in the period before 1997.
The Chinese are thus likely to be even more keen than in 1987 to see British military presence up to 1997 of a shape and size which could make a useful contribution in the event of serious and
prolonged internal unrest.
20.
Any hope of influencing the shape and size of the PLA Garrison to be stationed in Hong Kong 1997 by reducing the British Garrison very considerably in the years before then must now be even slimmer than it was in May 1989. As the discussions on the military estate have shown, the events of 1989 in China have placed the PLA in a very powerful position So far as the PRC's policy on Hong Kong is concerned. Whatever the concerns of others in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and elsewhere about maintaining confidence in Hong Kong, the military view of their requirements is likely to prevail. This will be based on their own concept of their modus operandi in Hong Kong, which will include the need to assist the Government of the SAR in the maintenance of order and in disaster relief if and when the situation requires. At recent Expert Talks on Defence Lands, for example, the PRC's military representatives have been totally uninterested in any views or advice from the British side on the most practicable and sensible arrangement of military locations after 1997. Nor have they been disposed to divulge any information about the make-up or number of the forces they intend to deploy here after 1997.
Perceptions in Hong Kong.
21.
At the time the 1987 Outline Withdrawal Plan was written, the HKG
Page 8 of 47 pages
LOCSEN
UK EYES A
SECRET
Redacted under FOI exemption section 27(1).
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.