TNAG-2238-FCO40-3217-Future-of-Hong-Kong-Royal-Navy-presence-1991 — Page 59

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

SECRET

35

FUTURE OF THE ROYAL NAVAL PRESENCE IN HONG KONG]

1.

AKBS 063/1

We have reached an impasse with the MOD. Further meetings at FCO/MOD official level will not get us anywhere. I hope that the Secretary of State will be willing to intervene with the Defence Secretary.

2.

State

G

-

The Governor intends to impress upon the Secretary of

at their meeting on 11 March his very great concern at the damage which this disagreement is doing. He says that he and his military advisers are in no doubt about the need to retain the patrol craft after 1992 if we are to have adequate control over Hong Kong's sea area, in the face of constant Chinese naval pressure. He is also convinced that to put to the Finance Committee the proposition that the HKG should pay more than the share agreed in the Defence Costs Agreement would do "very serious damage" to HMG's reputation in Hong Kong. Following the controversy over the contribution to the Gulf War, such a proposition would dramatically raise the emotional temperature (at a time when more generally calmer voices are beginning to prevail).

3.

The defence of Hong Kong is of course the responsibility of HMG. If a deal cannot be struck, I believe that the Governor will feel he must let the patrol craft go. This will be at least as damaging to HMG's reputation. And it will send a signal of weakness to Peking which is bound to be criticised in Parliament.

-

4. More seriously, the Chinese expect us to retain a naval prsence up to 1997. If this turns out not to be the case, then they will be greatly concerned. They will see this as a British trick designed to remove the rationale for a Chinese naval presence after 1997. To lose our naval presence will negate the purpose of the work that is about to begin on reprovisioning the naval facilities from HMS Tamar to Stonecutters Island. This would lead us into further difficulties over the defence lands issue and enable the Chinese to argue that we are removing the existing naval base (without their agreement) and going back on our promise to provide something else instead.

8 March 1991

Cc:

PS/PUS

Mr McLaren

Mr Davies, FED Mr Paul, HKD

A19ABD

SECRET

Andnew Rwan

RA Burns

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