SECRET
SECRET FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
TELNO 550
OF 211945Z MARCH 91
HKB OG 3
„CEIVSO IN REGISTRY
08APR 1991
DESK OFFICER
Regis
INDEX
PA
ACTIO
(36
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012075
MDHOAN 0327
TOP COPY
Q DIST?
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PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM BURNS, AUSS
YOUR TELNO 872 : HONG KONG PATROL CRAFT
1.
I AGREE THAT YOU WILL NEED TO SEND SOON A REPLY TO SIR MICHAEL QUINLAN'S LETTER TO YOU OF 4 FEBRUARY. I AM NOT SURE, HOWEVER, THAT THE FORMULATION PROPOSED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF YOUR TELEGRAM IS QUITE RIGHT. THE MOD MIGHT INTERPRET THIS AS AN INDICATION THAT YOU ARE NO LONGER PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES WITH THEM. MAY I THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT YOU SAY IN YOUR LETTER THAT YOU WILL BE DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF THE PATROL CRAFT WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO HONG KONG AND THAT YOU WILL REVERT THEREAFTER.
2.
LORD CAITHNESS WILL SHORTLY BE SENDING A HOLDING REPLY TO MR HAMILTON, EXPLAINING THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH THE DEFENCE SECRETARY ON HIS RETURN FROM HONG KONG. THE MOD ARE NOT (NOT) HAPPY ABOUT SUCH A DELAY BUT THIS SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE.
3.
I THINK IT LIKELY THAT WHILE IN HONG KONG THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL WISH TO REVIEW THE WHOLE ISSUE WITH AN OPEN MIND. HE WILL WANT TO DEVELOP A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF RN WITHDRAWAL ON:-
(A) THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG SEMI-COLON
(B)
PERCEPTIONS OF HMG'S COMMITMENT TO THE TERRITORY SEMI-COLON
(C) THE DEFENCE LANDS NEGOTIATIONS.
4.
I AM SURE THAT HE WILL WANT TO BE AS SUPPORTIVE AS POSSIBLE, BUT HE WILL BE AWARE OF THE VERY ACUTE PRESSURE ON THE DEFENCE BUDGET AND WILL NOT (NOT) WANT TO TACKLE THE DEFENCE SECRETARY UNLESS HE IS CONFIDENT THAT ALL ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN EXPLORED. NO DOUBT, HE WOULD IDEALLY LIKE TO HAVE A GENUINE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL TO PUT TO MR KING. AT THE LEAST, IT DOES
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