SECRET
changes to the withdrawal plan, there should be a reopening
of the DCA financial arrangements.
Sums involved in keeping patrol craft on are not large:
MOD's share (35% of the running costs) likely to be £7.5
million to 1997. Most unlikely that Governor will judge
that Hong Kong interests will be served by reopening DCA
issue. But point I want to add is that UK has its own
military as well as political interests at stake.
-
-
Political. The Chinese believe, rightly or wrongly, that
the patrol craft will remain in Hong Kong. It will send a
bad signal to Peking about our commitment to Hong Kong if
Would be seen they have to be withdrawn.
there and in
Hong Kong as signalling a diminution of our resolve to
continue to administer Hong Kong to 1997. Putting Hong Kong police crews on the ships would be missing the point. Withdrawal would also open up questions about our plans for the military garrison (due for MOD review in 1992:
Governor and the Commander of the British Forces in Hong
Kong (CBF) convinced we must stay stronger for longer).
Military. Both the Governor and the CBF are concerned that there should be sufficient backup for the Marine Police during run-up to 1997. The Chinese threat is real. Witness
the twenty-nine incursions last year and the reinforced
rules of engagement which were agreed last Spring as a
result.
History of the 80s underlines folly of signalling
a lowering of our guard in this way (cp, Falklands: HMS Endurance). Withdrawal now will add to the pressures
for greater military strength in future. After Tiananmen Square, the arguments deserve fresh study. Recall recent
JIC assessment (Threat to Hong Kong) flagged up the dangers.
A16ABN/2
SECRET
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.