TNAG-2237-FCO40-3216-Future-of-Hong-Kong-defence-and-public-order-1991 — Page 82

CONFIDENTIAL

into account ongoing and past work in similar fields as shown at Appendix 1, and note relevant work of other organisations eg ABCA and interoperability.

6. The study should establish a baseline by setting out current policy, the threats to the UK's OOA interests, and the military contingency plans to counter the threats. It should then identify future developments and project potential UK military tasks, determine the broad UK military capabilities, overseas facilities and assistance required to fulfil these tasks and further establish how these capabilities can be met by UK forces whose primary role will continue to be within

NATO.

7.

In accordance with the cos directive (") the study should consider "the co-ordination, command and control of SRF and OOA forces;" in this context the SRF Study (12) should be taken

into account.

8.

The study should also take into account relevant Concepts and Sub-Concepts and other studies when forming conceptual options for UK OOA operations; particularly those Sub-Concepts in which the investment priorities relate to equipment with clear OOA potential eg. Amphibious Warfare (13).

9. The study should consider how best to meet both the

expected and unexpected threats outside the NATO area and particularly the likely impact of a proliferation of NBC capabilities and the implications of major technological advances amongst the emergent nations. The use of civil assets to mount and sustain OOA operations should also be

addressed.

TIMING

CDS 11/86 00A Concept

11

12CDS20/89

-

SRF

13CDS 10/85 Sub-Concept for Amphibious Operations.

ana.2s1

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