TNAG-2228-FCO40-3200-Political-relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-Singapore-1991 — Page 45

RESTRICTED

Katt- AM 12/4

Issued.

@

it is urgent

Mr

Sainty

I shall not be able to do

this until

my

retur

could you check whether

HKB 020/11

a

anyone ase

can take it on!

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION

TANGLIN ROAD

SINGAPORE 1024

fa HK/Sing.

Pru 1814.

Pangge 1416.

26 February 1991

A R Paul Esq

Hong Kong Department Major

Das

Mr Pant has agreed

that this shows await

your return!

Dear Paul

CS

Wa

pace) +

FCO

SINGAPORE POLICY TOWARDS HONG KONG

1.

MsMajor

Please consider

& let me have a

reply

last

(1

चुर

You may find it useful to have a brief account of some recent views expressed privately by Singapore Ministers on Hong Kong. Both BG Yeo, Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Mah Bow Tan, Minister of State for Trade & Industry, in a conversation with Nigel Rich (Jardine Matheson Managing Director), spoke positively and constructively, indicating a willingness to help boost confidence, wherever they usefully could.

in

2. Yeo told me, when I called on him on 21 February, that it was in Singapore's "enlightened self-interest" to ensure that Hong Kong stayed afloat. But they were only small players. Where Singapore could help to stabilise the situation in Hong Kong, they would do so. This was why they had chosen to give potential Hong Kong Kong emigrants to Singapore a 5-year (renewable) option on Singaporean permanent residency rather than Singaporean passports. In this way, Singapore would become a second home to run to case of fire. A Singaporean school had recently been established in Hong Kong and an investment office would shortly be opened. There were good and regular contacts between Hong Kong and Singapore at all levels. More generally, Yeo said that Beijing viewed London with great suspicion. They saw the Hong Kong issue in terms of a power relationship if pressed they would forego all other advantages in order to establish their ascendancy. suggested that Singapore might be able to put over the right message to Beijing: the Chinese now had an Ambassador in Singapore and might listen to what Singapore had to say. Yeo was non- committal but admitted that Singapore could be useful to Hong Kong as the Chinese did not consider Singapore to be a threat and, therefore, took a reasonably relaxed approach towards Singapore.

I

3. Nigel Rich came to lunch on 20 February immediately after calling on Mah Bow Tan. Rich said that the Minister had been emphatic that Singapore had nothing to gain from any political or economic uncertainties over Hong Kong, let alone in any deterioration of the current situation. On the contrary, the Singaporean Government saw the existence of а prosperous and secure Hong Kong as being in Singapore's own interest and in the interest of the region as a whole. The Singaporean Government was therefore anxious to play a full part in confidence building measures in support of Hong Kong. Mah Bow Tan asked what impact

시

RESTRICTED

/supportive

Page 45Page 46

DIEL