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emergence of China as the alternative power center together make
this approach an ineffective one.
There is also the passive 'do-it-alone' option. The colonial
government can always manage to preserve its monopoly over power
by pursuing lethargic governance. If it refrains from making
difficult decisions and withdraws from taking policy initiatives,
the need to share power with others will be minimized. However,
in doing so it will be tantamount to giving up its responsibility
to effectively govern a place embroiled in drastic and difficult
changes. This will seriously jeopardize Hong Kong's future
prospects, create problems which will make life extremely
difficult for the colonial officials themselves, severely impair
Sino-British relationship, place Britain under international
censure, make Hong Kong a serious conflictual issue in British
domestic politics and render it impossible for Britain to exit in
glory in 1997. Therefore, if the colonial government is to follow
41 The decision of Britain to grant 50,000 elite families of Hong Kong the British nationality in 1989 might moderately widen the support base of the colonial government. But this is not enough to arrest the decline of colonial authority. Besides, as many of these families might eventually want to remain in Hong Kong, their interests might not coincide with those of the colonial government. In any case, their loyalty to Britain is quite fragile.
42 Despite the fiscal crunch, the government still seeks to enhance its legitimacy through performance. The decision to launch the huge Port and Airport Development Scheme is a case in point. However, the overall policy orientation of the government in the near future is the reduction of the government's role in the provision of social welfare and public services. In fact, the government is articulating a crude form of neo-conservatism which places emphasis on the free market and the family in the satisfaction of personal and social needs. See the Governor's 1990 speech in South China Morning Post, October 11, 1990, pp.
13-15.
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