TNAG-2217-FCO40-3184-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1991 — Page 100

15

future in no way helps maintain its political authority. Inasmuch

as Hong Kong Chinese take an instrumental and utilitarian stance

toward the colonial regime, the loss of its right to rule is

bound to invite non-deferential political actions against it. As

the myth of the longevity of the colonial government is shattered

and the people of Hong Kong have to apprehensively face an

uncertain political future which they abhor, they will gradually

see their interests as different from those of the colonial

government. The gap between them and the government has already

widened and is likely to widen further as 1997 approaches. It

will lead them to increasingly assert their interests against

what they perceive as the government's own self-interests. 16 As a

result, public pressure on the government will inexorably

escalate.

(2) Since the Sino-British negotiation over the political

future of Hong Kong in 1982, the autonomy of the colonial

government has suffered from an irreversible decline. The signing

of the Joint Declaration by China and Britain has in effect

brought the two superior governments to the center stage of local

politics, as they are ultimately responsible for the

implementation of the process of sovereignty transfer. To make

16 Notwithstanding the government's perennial claim to represent public interests, Hong Kong Chinese have a strong tendency to attribute self-seeking motive to the government. In a 1985 survey of mine, 61 percent of respondents agreed or very much agreed with the following statement: 'Most of the time the Hong Kong government avows that it is the protector of public interests. In reality, it always promotes its own interests.' See Lau and Kuan, The Ethos, p. 83. It can even be said that there is a deep-seated though barely perceptible anti-British feelings among the Hong Kong Chinese.