CONFIDENTIAL
CBF tend to be dealt with in the Governor's Security
Committee, of which CBF is a member.
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CBF rarely, if ever, spoke in ExCo. If he were to take a position on a domestic matter under discussion, other ExCo members might well question his basis for doing so.
3. Mr Burns and I probed this with various
counter-arguments such as: would we be able to answer
Ministers' concerns about maintaining effective
administration in Hong Kong up to 1997? Was there a risk of a gap opening up between the Hong Kong Government and the
Garrison? was CBF's presence on ExCo actually doing any harm? Surely the SAR Chief Executive would simply put the PLA General on his ExCo if he wished to do so, whether or
not CBF had previously been on ExCo?
4. The Governor seemed somewhat surprised at our less than
enthusiastic reaction. We pointed out that the MOD (pumped
up by CBF) would be bound to make difficulties and that we should therefore need clear arguments as to why this step
was necessary. The Governor agreed to reflect and put a
case to us by telegram. We will then need to seek Ministers' views: if we decide to go ahead I think it means a change in the Royal Instructions, and the Governor is inclined to make the change at the time CBF changes over: ie in the first half of next year. So we will need to act
quickly.
для
PF Ricketts
TEDAFL/2
CONFIDENTIAL
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