TNAG-2190-FCO40-3127-Hong-Kong-nationality-package-1990 — Page 46

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b)

c)

of constitutional and political development in Macau, compared with Hong Kong. It is also possible that our current

difficulties with the Chinese over direct elections encouraged

them to be more restrictive where elections to the Macau SAR's

legislature are concerned.

The provisions on continued service by Portuguese and other non-Chinese in the SAR Government are slightly more liberal than the equivalent provisions on expatriates serving in the Hong Kong SAR Government. This largely reflects the fact that in Macau, unlike Hong Kong, there is currently only a very small element of local participation in the public service. There is likely to be a considerable problem in grooming suitable local administrators to move into senior positions from 1999.

In the Macau agreement, the provision on defence of the SAR is even briefer than that in the Hong Kong Agreement, stating simply that the central government shall be responsible for defence. This leaves open the question of whether or not the PLA will eventually be stationed in Macau. It does not directly address the question of who will pay for the PLA and whether they will have any role in the internal affairs of the SAR. Hong Kong agreement specifies that military costs are for the central government and that the PLA shall not interfere in the

SAR's internal affairs.

The

a)

The Macau agreement contains no sections on shipping and civil aviation. This obviously reflects the fact that Macau is not a major port and has no international air services.

3. It seems that the Chinese were prepared to move hardly at all from the provisions of the Hong Kong agreement, which they treated throughout the negotiations as a blueprint for an eventual Macau agreement. So did the Portuguese, to the point (so Ke Zaishaw told us) of trying to insist on including civil aviation provisions! Portuguese conducted the negotiations in an ill-prepared and

не

The

CONFIDENTIAL