TNAG-2167-FCO40-3103-Diplomatic-representation-of-Hong-Kong-in-China-possible-est-1990 — Page 12

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c)

d)

privileges and immunities.

In practice, it might be housed in premises separate from the Embassy compound. However, assuming the Chinese would agree (which is by no means certain) to this arrangement, they would almost certainly treat the Office as part of the British Embassy with all the restrictions on contacts that this implies, e.g. with the HKMAO of the State Council. This option could also jeopardise the Office's continuation after 1997 as a body competent to represent Hong Kong's interests in the areas described in paragraph 6 because, in our judgement, the Chinese would be reluctant to allow an organisation which had been publicly part of the official British presence to convert smoothly into what they will see as part of the Chinese State structure. They have always argued, and will no doubt continue to argue, that the SARG will not be a successor to the HKG in strict sovereignty terms.

To build on the existing TDC Office in Peking with a view to converting it into an SARG Office after 1997. If we were envisaging the establishment of a Hong Kong office in Peking at an early date, which we were to start with, this might have been our preferred option. It would in a sense be a "mirror image" of NCNA in Hong Kong. We would need to inform the Chinese of our intention to second a number of HKG officers to the TDC office to perform various additional functions, but the Chinese would not need to accept an overt manifestation of what they might regard as "the three-legged stool".

To establish an overt Hong Kong Office separate from the British Embassy. If we were to propose such an Office now we believe that the Chinese would object to it. They have so far maintained the position that the HKG should not be a separate entity in external non-trade relations, which should be handled bilaterally between China and the UK. In the immediate run up to 1997 however, we believe that these sensitivities might be reduced. It should be easier for them to accept that an Office established in about 1995 would be a body set up on the lines of their Provisional Offices preparatory to the establishment of the SAR. It would help confidence if Hong Kong was openly "represented" in this way. Per contra, building on the TDC Office, although we could try to explain it as mirror imaging NCNA, might be perceived locally as insufficiently "representative". There is also a difficulty in that some members of the TDC do not want to see that body politicised. Our conclusion is that option d), in about 1995, is to be preferred, although option c) could be kept as a fall-back for the 1995/97 period if necessary.

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