TNAG-2161-FCO40-3083-Hong-Kong-visa-abolition-agreements-1990 — Page 140

of Ages.

JD 160

19.

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VAAS without a termination date would, with the

understanding of the third countries concerned, implicitly

survive 1997. The reference to "holders of Hong Kong

Travel Documents with the Right of Abode in Hong Kong"

would overcome the need to refer to British

nationals/British passports/Chinese nationals/HKSAR

passports. Consequently, negotiations on VAAS could start before the Chinese could sort out the HKSAR passport, thereby overcoming the difficulties identified in paragraphs 14 and 17.

20.

An added advantage of this option would be that

there would not be any need for further VAA negotiations

for the benefit of HKSAR passport holders.

21.

Obviously such a course of action would require

prior consultation with the Chinese. But as such VAAS

would benefit not only BN (O)s but also future HKSAR passport holders, the Chinese might agree to us going down. this path.

22.

There might well be legal and political

difficulties. One problem which suggests itself

immediately is that third countries would be likely to

question our authority to negotiate VAAS (the Japanese for

instance want UK confirmation that we are authorised to

talk to them on multi-entry visa arrangements for

businessmen). We would need authorisation from UK if we

rather than the UK are to conduct the negotiations. Recent

indications are that this should not be a problem.

It

1 would however be inappropriate for China to "authorise" us

to enter into commitment for the HKSAR.

A way out could

be for China to notify the third countries concerned that

after 1997 they/HKSAR Government would honour the commitments entered by Hong Kong in the VAAS.

23.

This appears to be an option to which we should

give further thought.

GF 323

SCR 13/2071/47 pt. 5

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