nationality restrictions on key posts may severely limit the
numbers of suitable candidates. However, we have generally
accepted that the Chinese would wish to limit certain posts to
Chinese nationals and that we cannot claim that this is in
contravention of the JD.
to
It is clear that Chinese leaders are very suspicious of our
motives. They appear to believe that by granting passports key personnel we are seeking to extend British influence in
Hong Kong beyond 1997. We cannot expect them to support the
package, but our aim should be to dispel their suspicions as
far as we can, and to get them to say as little as possible in
public.
Consular Protection
Background
The Chinese have said publicly that those covered by the scheme
would not be entitled to British consular protection in Hong
Kong since China would still regard them as Chinese.
We are very unlikely to reach agreement with the Chinese either
on a legal or practical basis. The most we can hope for is to
agree to differ with minimal damage to confidence in Hong Kong.
We cannot in practice guarantee consular protection for
beneficiaries of our scheme people in the SAR or China (cf the
position of Hong Kong residents presently who travel in China). However, in time we may find that in practice the Chinese will
take a more flexible approach than their recent statements indicate. The key seems to lie in renunciation of Chinese nationality (without the requirement to have lived abroad). This would enable the Chinese authorities to recognise the
beneficiaries as foreign nationals and thus entitled to
consular protection. The Chinese have indicated reluctance to
contemplate mass renunciations but there may be scope to explore this option with them.
SAKACG (4)
Democracy
What will restore confidence in Hong Kong
The Bill is irrelevant.
is more/full democracy now
Line to Take
[Mr Maude to draft]
Democracy
Background
Following discussions with the Chinese Government in 1987, we
announced in a Hong Kong Government White Paper of 1988 that
ten directly elected seats would be introduced to Hong Kong's
legislature in 1991. After the Tiananmen Square incident, it
was clear that Hong Kong opinion wanted more. For example, a consensus among the Executive and Legislative Council Members
(OMELCO), which seemed to be broadly representative, pressed
for 20 seats out of 60 (33%).
The February 1989 draft of the Basic Law allowed for 15 seats
out of 55 (27%). In December 1989, this was increased to 18
out of 60 (30%).
There was clearly a large gap between Hong Kong aspirations and Chinese intentions. Following further
intensive negotiations with the Chinese the Foreign Secretary
announced in the House of Commons on 16 February the
introduction of 18 directly elected seats in the legislature in
1991. This decision is just two seats below the OMELCO
consensus but substantially more than the ten seats which were
originally envisaged in Hong Kong's 1988 White Paper.
return for this small concession, we secured from the Chinese
improvements in the Basic Law which provide for a continuous
SAKACG (6)
In
E
upward slope in the development of democracy from 18 seats in 1991 to 30 seats in 2003, with the possibility that full direct
elections could be introduced in 2007.
This rate of progress is not as rapid as many people in Hong
Kong, or the British Government, would have liked to see. But there was also considerable relief in Hong Kong that a major
uncertainty for the territory's future had been removed. As OMELCO themselves recognised in their statement of 16 February,
the task now is to make a success of the 1991 elections. We
hope that once the Chinese have seen the 1991 legislature working in practice they will in time come to accept the view that a higher proportion of directly elected seats should be introduced in 1995, when the last elections under British
Administration are due to take place. That is why the number
of directly elected seats in 1995 remains open.
Letter from Mr Bowen Wells (democracy)
Background
Mr Bowen Wells has recently written to the Secretary of State reiterating that only by aggressively developing democracy in Hong Kong can we persuade key people to remain. He adds that, by offering passports, we are discouraging people from remaining to participate in the development of democracy, which is always difficult to encourage when there is not a tradition or a functioning parliamentary democracy. This argument does not seem relevant to the Nationality Bill: the Bill is intended to encourage people to stay; whether or not they then participate in democracy or for example work in business is their own choice and unaffected by the passport issue. Furthermore, Mr Bowen Wells argument undermines his own.
contention that we should aggressively develop democracy: people would be even less likely to participate in the new system if it had been one which went further then the Chinese were prepared to tolerate and which they had denounced.
Finally, Mr Bowen Wells adds that what is needed to ensure Hong
SAKACG (7)
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.