contravention of the JD.
4. It is clear that Chinese leaders are very suspicious of our
motives. They appear to believe that by granting passports to key
personnel we are seeking to extend British influence in Hong Kong
beyond 1997. We cannot expect them to support the package, but our
aim should be to dispel their suspicions as far as we can, and to
get them to say as little as possible in public.
Consular Protection
5. The Chinese have said publicly that those covered by the scheme
would not be entitled to British counsular protection in Hong Kong
since China would still regard them as Chinese.
6.
[Legal position to follow.]
7. We are very unlikely to reach agreement with the Chinese either
on a legal or practical basis. The most we can hope for is to agree to differ with minimal damage to confidence in Hong Kong. We cannot in practice guarantee consular protection for beneficiaries of our
scheme people in the SAR or China (cf the position of Hong Kong
residents presently who travel in China). However, in time we may
find that in practice the Chinese will take a more flexible approach
than their recent statements indicate. The key seems to lie in
renunciation of Chinese nationality (without the requirement to have
lived abroad). This would enable the Chinese authorities to
recognise the beneficiaries as foreign nationals and thus entitled
to consular protection. The Chinese have indicated reluctance to
contemplate mass renunciations but there may be scope to explore
this option with them.
FABAJR (4)
Page 45Page 46
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.