legislature are diluted by the votes of the GEC elected members in the proportion of 12-18. It is certainly worthwhile trying to get this proposal removed as part of an overall package or at least confined to private members bills. However, inconvenient though the system may be, it does not seem to me to be the most disadvantageous proposal.
9.
The 15% restriction is, as we said in our telno 208 a convergence problem. In addition it is difficult to see how it could be applied except by nominating certain constituencies as "foreigners also" constituencies. This appears to be Miss Tam's understanding of the Chinese intentions. Such provision would not, however, ensure that the restriction operated at the 15% level unless it were a question of "foreigners only" constituencies. I should add that even these unattractive means of achieving the Chinese intentions would not be inconsistent with the Joint Declaration, though something would need to be done about Article 26 of the 1989 text.
10.
The GEC is, to my view, the most significant of the second line issues. Even if the GEC is different from the election committee proposed for the election of the first Chief Executive, we know absolutely nothing of its proposed composition or constitution; and reasoning by analogy with paragraph 3 of the draft decision of the NPC gives little comfort. That paragraph leaves it open as to whether the committee is to be chosen by election, selection or nomination and its composition duplicates, as to three-quarters, the functional constituencies.
Pod floor.
Paul Fifdot
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