TNAG-2120-FCO40-3026-Hong-Kong-Garrison-future-of-the-Royal-Navy-presence-1990 — Page 213

CODE 18-77

SECRET

HKC OG 2/1

RECEIVED IN R

"Y

01 MAY 1990

Ms Howard

Sec(0) (C)

NDE

RN PATROL CRAFT IN HONG KONG

1.

Reference...........MR. MCLAREN

Hi Pext, Hai)

12

we

Can't

allow

The M76D)

with

this.

(or

The

неёл

10

€

wyer away

to sing the core Feo).

be realy

ler one

ich will

Imitervene -

it you think 1471 I (os ir rank) shall drea

I am sending an interim reply to your minute of 19 March, in

order to meet your deadline of noon on the same day.

$15/3

2. Your draft telegram is, I regret, not an accurate summary of

HMG's position since we are on record as taking a contrary view. Nor does it, I think, accurately reflect the discussion held at the Hong Kong Steering Committee meeting held on 2 February. I note

that no minutes have yet been produced.

3.

I think it must be clear from Mr Paul's letter of 31 January to

Mr Halfield that we do not accept that there is no military case for retention of a Navy presence, although we acknowledge that we are not experts. Nor do we accept Bird Class vessels are a realistic

alternative.

4. On the military threat, I cannot recall the Steering Committee taking a definitive view that there was no military case. There is, a strong political case as well, and we are grateful that

the decision has been taken to retain the presence.

of course,

5. On Bird versus Peacock, I recall that an MOD officer at the meeting acknowledged that Bird Class vessels simply would not be able to undertake some of the essential functions of the Peacocks.

6.

Financial arrangements simply were not discussed at the Steering Committee meeting. My understanding was that this was left on one side for negotiation. But, given the above, I do not think the FCO would accept the premises on which you base your arguments.

ROYAQW

SECRET