TNAG-2119-FCO40-3025-Future-of-Hong-Kong-general-1990 — Page 75

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recognizable) is likely to drive them into conflict with others,

though in the meantime there is no way to determine the intensity

and scope of conflict. In the beginning of the conflict, the

'stayers' might demand equal treatment with the 'sojourners' both

economically and socially, and they would be opposed to public

policies which would give preferential treatment to the

'sojourners.' It is not impossible that eventually they might

demand preferential treatment for themselves. The fact that

Chinese nationals are already guaranteed a privileged political

status by the Basic Law (only those Chinese nationals without

foreign passports or rights of abode elsewhere can fill top

governmental posts after 1997) would mean that the 'stayers' will

be well-placed to use political means to achieve their social and

economic ends.

(3) Hong Kong-China conflict To the Hong Kong Chinese, the

reversion of sovereignty to China in 1997 is an abrupt decision

imposed on them against their will by the Chinese government.

Their attitudes toward China are a combination of fear,

hostility, condescension and aversion. This can easily be

explained by the fact that many Chinese have fled to Hong Kong to

escape from communist rule, the vastly divergent paths of development of Hong Kong and China since the Second World War and

the staggering disparity in living standards and way of thinking

between the people in the two societies.

Objectively speaking, China and Hong Kong all along have

shared a lot of common and complementary interests. Because of

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