CONFIDENTIAL
A
EXTRACT FROM
FROM SIRG
SIRG HOWE'S
MINUTE OF
7 MARCH 197:
SHOULD HMG GO BEYOND THE CARR-ROBERTSON ASSURANCE AND SEEK TO TAKE OVER THE PENSION ENTITLEMENTS OF HONG KONG HMOCS OFFICERS?
ON WHAT TERMS?
IF SO
14. If Ministers
accept
that HMG would have to take responsibility for the pensions of HMOCS in Hong Kong in the event of a default the question arises whether we should initiate a formal take-over of the
before 1997. This pensions
be on would
lines which have
become standard elsewhere, but with the important difference that
i s not Hong Kong, which
aid-worthy, would me et the cost.
or not i t question arises irrespective of whether
at
ог
to reaffirm
taking over
Carr-Robertson Assurance).
responsibility
9
is
financial
(The
proves necessary The main argument for
to
i s not
extinguish the
inconsiderable.
estimate i s currently
contingent liability. The money at stake Excluding widows' benefits for which по available, expenditure on pensions would be approximately £10 million pa (at 1984-85 prices and exchange rates) at the turn of the
century. The trend would be downwards, but the liability would not be finally extinguished until 2040. HMG would have to finance this itself if the SAR Government defaulted. The risk would be avoided
by
for responsibility to arranging
pass to HMG before Chinese
sovereignty is resumed: the Hong Kong Government would finance the pensions by handing over capitalised values of the entitlements (if necessary in a phased programme). As at 1997, these would be in the region of £210 million at 1984-85 prices and exchange rates.
15. The Hong Kong Government is strongly opposed to a take-over because of the divisive effect this would have on the public
service.
It would also be difficult to persuade the Legislative Council to approve the £210m representing the capitalised value of
the pensions.
Moreover, action on HMOCS pensions by HMG would
indeed
inevitably undermine our reas sur ances
Agreement;
on the
of credibility
there i s
case a
for
leaving responsiblity
the
for
these pensions with the SAR Government
as a mark of our faith in the
Agreement. The balance of argument is therefore against early action, but the question should be looked at again, perhaps in about
1990.
CONFIDENTIAL
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