continue the policy of building contacts which we have followed steadily for forty years.
Of course Britain has a particular justification for keeping in touch with Peking. We have to prepare for the day in 1997 when Hong Kong returns to China, and to do so responsibly. Because of this I had the total
understanding of my EC colleagues when I told them that Francis Maude was going to Peking. There was no question of breaching an agreed EC line. It had always been accepted that there were particular reasons why Britain (and indeed Portugal because of Macao) should need from time to time to send a Minister to Peking. In Hong Kong too that need is recognised. The comments from Hong Kong which reach the British media tend to be of the noisier kind. There is a widespread but quieter welcome in Hong Kong for the fact that we are, by frequent discussion with Peking, taking seriously our
responsibilities under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. The idea that we would in some way be helping Hong Kong if we were to cut ourselves off from China does not survive a minute's serious examination.
What form should and do these discussions with Peking take? Obviously they do not consist in finding out what the Chinese want us to do and then doing it. The charge of 'kowtowing' may be irrestible journalese, but it does not fit the facts. If that had been our policy we would not be moving to the direct democratic election next year of 18 seats in the Hong Kong Legislative Council. If that had been our policy we would obviously have dropped the Nationality Bill as soon as the Chinese criticised it. If that had been our
givar
policy Hong Kong would not have, first asylum to the boat
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