TNAG-2056-FCO40-2934-Hong-Kong-and-the-Organisation-for-Economic-Cooperation-and--1990 — Page 29

the dialogue as a graduation ploy, undermining Malaysia's tions within the G77. Government officials were forbidden to attend dialogue meetings. The private-sector ISIS acted as the unoffical contact point on OECD/DAE matters. Taniguchi added that Mahatir's views were not necessarily shared by other members of his Cabinet. But they were a powerful constraint on Malaysian participation. There was a lot to do to induce a more cooperative Malaysian attitude.

5. There were no such hang-ups in Singapore where the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Trade and Industry had been very positive. ASEAN solidarity did act as a brake on a more active Singaporean role but Taniguchi did not think this a major problem.

6. Taniguchi had had a very friendly and productive visit to Hong Kong. The Secretary for Trade & Industry had welcomed many of the OECD ideas, particularly those on urban environment and on telecommunications. He had made clear that the colony wanted to esablish relations with international organisations and would be able to act autonomously in this regard even after 1997. Hong Kong was keenly interested in the post-Uruguay Round meeting (popular with most other DAEs too) but less so in the bankers' meeting.

1.

The Assistant Minister of Finance of Korea had also been an ally, seeing the dialogue as an important stepping stone in Korea's preparation for OECD membership. Official policy was that Korea should join the OECD by 1995; but there was some unease ' about the obligations that Korea would be asked to assume (heightened by Korea's present economic difficulties); and the rapprochement with North Korea had pushed OECD accession down the Ipolitical agenda.

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CGNME discussion

8. In the discussion which followed, there was general

endorsement for Taniguchi's approach. Most could already approve the revised list of "deepening" topics, though some had doubts about some of the remaining "broadening" issues, including the new one on Eastern Europe, added at DAE request.

9. Australia wanted to see quicker progress in integrating the dialogue into the work of OECD committees (more back-to-back meetings). I reminded partners that the dialogue was not an end in itself but a means to an end drawing the DAES into a closer partnership in the management of world trade and economic issues, and for some, towards the obligations of OECD membership. This might imply (ie in the case of Korea) an early need for frank talking among Government officials, not always in the "tripartite formula" (officials, businessmen, academics). We should not be worried by the prospect of "variable geometry" (less than universal DAE attendance at all dialogue meetings and less than