TNAG-2032-FCO40-2895-Visit-by-Douglas-Hurd--Secretary-of-State-for-Foreign-and-Co-1990 — Page 67

FOREIGN SBC:

SPERCH

-4-

HONG KONG GENERAL CHAMBER OF COXXXKCB - 15 JANUARY 1990

PORBIGN SECRETARY (CONTD):

For all those and other reasons, we must do what we can I

am talking of the British to ensure that the final chapter in our

long administration of Hong Kong 16 an honourable one and one which

ends successfully for you, That chapter is unique, the set of

problems is unique, because the basis of the future is not

independence but the basis of the future is one country/two systems.

That is a far-sighted concept; we have to make it work and

everybody know that is not easy, is not proving easy, will not prove

easy or straightforward. There are not any convenient precedents;

there are not any ready-made models to follow; there are problems.

there are setbacks; there are bound to be these from time to time,

but there is no alternative to making a success of this particular

enterprise.

The British Government cannot and has no intention of sitting

back and letting the clock tick quietly onwards towards 1997. The

choices and decisions we bave to take from time to time will be

hard, the choices and decisious which the Government of Hong Kong

will have to take from time to time will be bard, and we will take

those difficult decisions when they are necessary.

The framework is the Joint Declaration. I had nothing to do

with its origins, but I bave always felt that it was the best deal

that could have been secured for Hong Kong. It has its critics but

to those critics I would say: "Can you bonestly think of a better

alternative? Do you think that if a better Agreement could have

been reached, we would not have reached it? Do you believe that no

Agreement would really have been in the best interests of Hong Kong

as the clock ticked on?”