TNAG-2028-FCO40-2890-Hong-Kong-freezing-of-Kuwaiti-and-Iraqi-assets-1990 — Page 109

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072412 MDHOAN 4493

THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SPOKEN ABOUT BRITISH EFFORTS TO SECURE THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BLOCKADE, BUT WHAT IF THIS DID NOT WORK?

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPLIED THAT WE HAD SENT OUR FORCES FOR TWO REASONS. TO PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF IRAQI AGGRESSION AND TO JOIN IN THE EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT UNSCR 661. LIKE THE US, WE HAVE NOT EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER MEASURES IF THE PRESENT ONES DID NOT WORK. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEE WHETHER THE BLOCKADE WOULD WORK OR NOT. WE HAD TO TRY TO ENSURE IT DID. SHEIKH SABAH POINTED TO BRITAIN'S ASSISTANCE IN 1961 WHEN BRITISH TROOPS PREVENTED IRAQ INVADING KUWAIT. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE FEELINGS FOR KUWAIT WHICH EXISTED THEN REMAINED. HE REPEATED HIS APPRECIATION OF OUR EFFORTS AT THE UN, BUT THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT NEEDED TO BE GIVEN HOPE THAT THEY WOULD SOON BE FREE OF SADDAM HUSSAIN.

5.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE IRAQI OCCUPATION STRUCK AT THE VERY HEART OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WAS A WICKED ACT. THE UN HAD DECIDED ON THE MEASURES IT WOULD TAKE AT PRESENT TO TRY TO REVERSE IRAQ'S OCCUPATION. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE STAYED IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT AND WE WOULD ASK OUR AMBASSADOR IN RIYADH TO ACT AS A LINK OVER THIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOPED TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA SOON AND HOPED HE COULD MAKE CONTACT THEN. HE WAS ANXIOUS TO REMAIN AWARE OF KUWAITI THINKING. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF BRITAIN ACCEPTING THE IRAQI OCCUPATION. KUWAIT WOULD REMAIN FOR US A SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE. BUT SECURING THAT OBJECTIVE MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME.

6. SHEIKH SABAH RAISED THE PROBLEMS BEING FACED BY THE KUWAITI EMBASSY HERE OVER FINANCING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEMS HAD NOW BEEN SOLVED, BUT WOULD ENSURE THAT THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WERE CLEARED.

7. THE SHEIKH ASKED FOR NEWS OF KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RESPONDED THAT WE HAD NO DEFINITE NEWS. THE PROBLEM OF JORDAN WAS A MAJOR ONE. KING HUSSEIN HAD MADE A MAJOR ERROR OF JUDGEMENT OVER IRAQ AND WAS FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO CORRECT HIS MISTAKES WITH SAFETY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT HE SHOULD SURVIVE AND THAT JORDAN SHOULD IMPLEMENT FULLY THE UNSCRS. WE ALL HAD TO HELP HIM TO DO BOTH, IF HE WAS WILLING TO DO SO. THE SHEIKH WONDERED WHAT POSSIBLE MESSAGE THE KING COULD HAVE FROM SADDAM HUSSAIN. SADDAM HAD SPOKEN TODAY OF AN IRAQ STRETCHING FROM ZAKHO TO MEDINA. HE SEEMED TO BE LOSING TOUCH WITH REALITY.

8.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT THE KING FACED POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SADDAM IN JORDAN, PARTICULARLY FROM

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